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Abstract
The informal sector accounts for a substantial fraction of employed population in Mexico
and other Latin American countries. In this paper we study the interaction between the
tax and transfers system and the size and composition of informal sector. To do that we
build a search model that can be calibrated to the Mexican data. Our model features two
employment statuses: employed and unemployed; and two sectors: formal and informal.
We estimate our model to data from Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacio´n y empleo (ENOE) by
simulated GMM. Then we perform three diﬀerent policy analyses: changes in the distribution
of the transfers between formal and informal sector workers, changes in the size of the transfer
system, and changes in the progressivity of taxes and transfers (pending).
Our model is able to capture key features of Mexican labor markets, such as the distribution of
the labor force across sectors and the distribution of accepted wage oﬀers. Dividing transfers
equally between formal and informal sector workers increases the size of the informal sector
by 5 percentage points, it also increases average wages in the formal sector by 6% whereas
wages in the informal sector fall by 4%. When we double the size of transfers, the size of
informal sector falls by 5 percentage points. However, it has a big eﬀect on the distribution
of accepted wage oﬀers: average wages increase by 10% in the formal sector and they raise
by 16% in the informal sector.
∗Corresponding author: jorge.alonso@itam.mx
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1 Introduction
The informal sector accounts for roughly 50% of the employed population in Mexico, a feature that
is shared by many Latin American countries. This may be a barrier to development for a wealth
of reasons. Workers employed in the informal sector do not participate in the tax and transfer
system that allows the funding of education, health, retirement benefits and infrastructure, to
mention a few. A sizable informal sector has been found to be related to lower productivity, either
through using less eﬃcient technologies or through a limited size necessary to be undetectable
(see Cavalcanti & Antunes (2007), Leal (2009) and Moscoso & Erasmo (2010)). There are also
papers that relate the size of the informal sector to less education (xxxx). As a consequence of
these, Mexico’s income per capita may be smaller than it could be with a smaller informal sector.
Naturally the size of the informal sector worries policy makers all over the world.
In this paper we investigate the eﬀects of tax and transfer policies on the size of the informal
sector and the consequences to the aggregate variables of the Mexican economy. In particular,
the distribution of the labor force, the distribution of accepted wage oﬀers and productivity. This
is in contrast with studies that deal with policies aimed to reduce the size of the informal sector
through direct enforcement (see De Paula & Sheinkman (2010), Dabla-Norris et. al (2008) and
Kuhen (2010)) and more in line with the idea that the informal sector is the product of choice
and institutions such as a tax and transfer system (as in Perry, Maloney et al. (2002)) We want
to provide a careful quantitative assessment of important policy reforms (see Schneider (2007) for
a broad discussion on policies aimed to reduce the size of the shadow economy.)
To study this issue we build a search model in the spirit of McCall (1970.) The model features four
diﬀerent labor market states: employment-unemployment in the formal sector and employment-
unemployment in the informal sector. Therefore a worker may be employed in the formal sector,
unemployed in the formal sector, employed in the informal sector and unemployed in the informal
sector. With this model we are able to study policies that may change the value of unemployment
in the formal sector and therefore the value of being employed in the formal sector. The main
idea of the paper may still seem counterintuitive to many policy makers as if a country suﬀers
from the malaise of informality, an increase in the generosity of the transfers system, when it is
conditional on belonging to the formal sector, may help to reduce the size of the informal sector in
a significant way. This is a quantitative exercise, as policies may change the value of employment
and unemployment in opposite directions. Only with a model we can quantify the equilibrium
results. We start by focusing on the eﬀects of such policies on the decisions of workers, taking as
given the distribution of wage oﬀers in the formal and informal sector. This is particularly conve-
nient to isolate the eﬀect of the tax and transfers system on choice. It is also useful to understand
how taxes and transfers influence the distribution of accepted wage oﬀers. If we identified an
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employment with a wage, and wages with a measure of productivity, the distributions of accepted
wage oﬀers become an important element to our analysis because they measure how workers are
allocated into diﬀerent productivities (note: these results are pending on a general equilibrium of
our model). Our model is then extended to a general equilibrium setup. We do that by using
two diﬀerent frameworks. In the context of search frictions, as in Mortensen & Pissarides (1994,)
we introduce matching technologies for the formal and informal sectors, and include formal and
informal firms that post formal and informal vacancies. This allows us to study the potential role
of stochastic rationing into determining the distribution of employment. Then we study the same
problem in the context of competitive search to understand the general equilibrium implications
without matching frictions. To our knowledge this is one of the first quantitative papers that deals
with multi-sector search models.
We estimate our model by simulated GMM1 to key moments of Mexican labor markets using
micro-data from “National Employment and Occupational Survey” (Encuesta Nacional de Ocu-
pacio´n y Empleo (ENOE) in Spanish.) We use the calibrated model to simulate three diﬀerent
type of policies: changes in the distribution of transfers between the formal and informal workers,
changes in the size of the transfers, and changes in the structure of the tax and transfers system.2
Next we give a preview of our results. A toy version of our model fits consistently important
features of the Mexican data, such as the distribution of employment, unemployment and wages.
Selection into formal or informal employment have a big impact on the observed distribution of
wages. The mean of the ex-ante distribution of wage oﬀers in the formal sector relative to the
informal sector is 1.76, whereas this same statistic is 1.52 using the distributions of accepted wage
oﬀers. Therefore, the informality wage gap is bigger than the one we observe in the data and
workers’ choices reduce this gap.
We find that when we change the distribution of the transfers from our benchmark calibration,
where informal workers receive 20% of the transfers, to informal workers receiving 50% of the
transfers, the informal sector raises by 5 percentage points3. The average wage using the distri-
bution of accepted wage oﬀers in the formal sector increases by 6% whereas the same statistic for
informal workers falls by 4%. This may flag substantial productivity changes across sectors and
for the Mexican economy overall.
We also find that doubling the size of transfers increase the size of the informal sector by 5 per-
centage points, going in the opposite direction of splitting transfers in half between formal and
1As future work we are planning to estimate our model as a nested likelihood problem in the spirit of Keane &
Moﬃt (1998) to check how sensitive our results are to the estimation technique
2For example, if we look to OECD countries, taxes and transfers are progressive. This may change the value of
the diﬀerent options that a worker face in quantitatively important ways.
3Note that this is not directly comparable to the other experiment as the value of the transfers is changing
within and across experiments
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informal unemployed workers. This is conditional on our benchmark calibration assuming that
formal workers 80% of the transfers. Doubling the size of the transfer system also has substantial
eﬀects on the distribution of accepted wage oﬀers. Average wage in the formal sector raises its
average wage by 10% and if also raises average wages in the informal sector by 16%.
From a policy perspective, policies aimed to be more “fair” to informal workers increase the size of
the informal sector without improving inequality (as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient on wages.)
However, policies that increase the generosity of the transfer system, while restricting the transfers
to formal workers, may substantially reduce the size of the informal sector and improve inequality.
Our paper is closely related to Albrecht et al. (2009) in that we use a search model to study the
impact of taxes and transfers on the size of the informal sector. However our paper diﬀers in several
important dimensions. We start by focusing on the workers’ decision problem in a choice theoretic
framework rather than Pissarides’ equilibrium unemployment model, although we later extend our
model in that direction; the choice structure of our model also diﬀers in several elements that will
be discussed in the following sections. This bottom-up approach also has the advantage of allowing
us to understand what is the role of each of the elements that we introduce in our model. Workers
are ex-ante homogeneous in our model, but they receive independent realizations drawn from an
exogenous wage distribution that makes them ex-post heterogenous. They assume that workers
are ex-ante heterogeneous in their ability-productivity so they self select into informality. Finally,
we focus on the transfer side of the tax and transfer system. There is a tax levied on formal sector
workers that is used to finance transfers like unemployment benefits, severance payments4, social
security and health insurance among other welfare benefits. Our transfers are given conditional
on previously being a formal sector worker whereas in Albrecht et al. (2009) the unemployment
state is not conditional on the sector workers belong to. We show that this distinction is very
important to understand the eﬀects of the tax and transfers system on informality.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents evidence on the characteristics of Mexican
labor market from ENOE and the size and composition of its tax and transfer system compared
to other OECD countries. Section 3 lays down the model. Section 4 explains the calibration
procedure to fit relevant statistics taken from ENOE. Section 5 present simulation results and
Section 6 concludes and discusses extensions for future research.
2 Data
In this section we briefly present some facts for Mexico. It is worth pointing out that these features
are shared to some degree by many developing economies, particularly in Latin America.
4The severance payment is levied on the firm in the real world. As we will abstract from firms, this can be
consider as a reduced form when firms pass on the severance tax on formal sector workers’ wages
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We focus on Mexico because it has a large informal sector and a rich data set which is relevant to
the purpose of this paper. Additionally, Mexico has recently been in the spotlight of the policy
debate surrounding informal sector literature.
We use data from the ”National Employment and Occupational Survey” (ENOE in Spanish.)
ENOE is a household survey that aims to measure unemployment and working conditions for
a representative sample of the Mexican economy. The ENOE includes some questions that can
be used to classify the labor force into formal and informal employment. Following the Mexican
Law, we set as informal to all those workers that do not have Social Security provided as part
of their job benefits. All employers in Mexico are required by law to enroll their employees into
the Social Security system. If an employee provides information revealing that no Social Security
is provided in the current job, then we classify such an employee as informal. If an employee is
not enrolled in the Social Security System, that employee will not pay taxes and will lack of the
transfers provided by the government. As for the self-employed workers, they are not required to
enroll in the Social Security system. We think of them as informal too because the incidence of tax
evasion is big in this group. Table 1 presents the main characteristics of the labor force according
to this classification. These numbers will be later use as moments to match in the estimation of
our model. Note the distribution of the labor force between formal and informal sector is derived
as the stationary distribution implied by the transition matrix between sectors that we show in
Table 2. We use this numbers to be consistent with the definition of steady state in our model
Table 1. Labor Force Statistics
Sector Employment Unemployment Mean Wage Std. Wage
Formal .419 .024 31.69 31.63
Informal .539 .025 21.06 24.24
Note first that more than 50% of employed workers is in the informal sector. Also note that
the informal sector is characterized by a lower mean wage with also a lower standard deviation.
With our model we will be able to tell how much of these diﬀerences are due to the selection into
diﬀerent sector’s employment.
Table 2. Labor Market Transition Matrix
rows: t col: t+ 1 Formal Informal Unemployed
Formal .84 .13 .30
Informal .10 .85 .05
Unemployed .23 .48 .29
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3 Model
To study the eﬀect of the tax and transfer policies laid out in the introduction, we build a model
that is simple enough to understand the main forces that we think are behind the distribution of
employment and unemployment of the Mexican economy. Then we extend the model to general
equilibrium to be able to provide an adequate framework to understand how productivity and the
distribution of wages changes when we change policies. This may also allow us to provide welfare
measures of the policy changes.
3.1 A Toy Structural Model of the Mexican Economy
The economy is populated with a continuum of risk-neutral workers that discount consumption
streams at a rate β. Workers are ex-ante identical but they face draws from two diﬀerent distri-
butions of wage oﬀers. GF is the distribution of wage oﬀers in the formal sector and GI is the
distribution of wage oﬀers in the informal sector. Draws from both distributions are assumed to
be independent for simplicity.
The individual state variables are employment status (employed or unemployed,) employment sec-
tor (formal or informal) and current wage (wF or wI .) Employed workers face an exogenous sector
specific separation probability, λi where i ∈ {F, I}. We abstract from on the job search because
ENOE is quarterly and average duration of unemployment is less than a quarter in Mexico. Thus,
observed transitions from formal to informal employment and vice-versa may include a short pe-
riod of unemployment which can not be measured. We opt for the simpler specification of the
model, although we acknowledge that there may in fact be direct transitions between employments
without going through unemployment
Workers employed in the formal sector face a tax system T (wF ) whereas those employed in the
informal sector do not pay taxes. Unemployed workers that come from the formal sector receive
some fraction (θ) of the tax proceeds as a transfer: ΩF (wF ). This transfer can be understood as un-
employment benefits, severance payments averaged over the periods that the worker is unemployed
and the cash present discounted value of health insurance and retirement benefits. Unemployed
workers from the informal sector get the remaining fraction ((1−θ)) of taxes as a transfer ΩI(wI).
This may include welfare programs that are universal or specially targeted to them, such as Seguro
Popular. Every period unemployed workers get a draw from both formal and informal sector wage
distributions with independent probabilities φi where i ∈ {F, I}. They must choose whether they
remain unemployed or accept any of the oﬀers at hand.
Next we present the Bellman equations that characterizes the decision structure of our model and
lay out the concept of equilibrium that we use. For that we need to characterize the steady state
equilibrium level of employment and unemployment in the formal and informal sectors and the
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steady state distributions of accepted wage oﬀers in the formal and informal sector.
3.1.1 Value functions
The decision problem of an individual is characterized by four Bellman equations: the value of
being employed in the formal sector with a wage wF , WF (wF ); the value of being employed in
the informal sector with a wage wI , WI(wI); the value of being unemployed from a formal sector
employment with wage wF , UF (wF ); and the value of being unemployed from an informal sector
employment with wage wI , UI(wI)5
1. Value of being employed in the formal sector: note that we do not allow for on the job search
so far:
WF (wF ) = wF − T (wF ) + β [λFUF (wF ) + (1− λF )WF (wF )] (1)
2. Value of being employed in the informal sector
WI(wI) = wI + β [λIUI(wI) + (1− λI)WI(wI)] (2)
3. Value of being unemployed in the formal sector
UF (wF ) = ΩF (wF ) + β [φFφIEmax {WF (w￿F ),WI(w￿I), UF (wF )}
+φF (1− φI)Emax {WF (w￿F ), UF (wF )}
+ φI(1− φF )Emax {WI(w￿I), UF (wF )}+ (1− φF )(1− φI)UF (wF )]
(3)
4. Value of being unemployed in the informal sector
UI(wI) = ΩI(wI) + β [φFφIEmax {WF (w￿F ),WI(w￿I), UI(wI)}
+ φF (1− φI)Emax {WF (w￿F ), UI(wI)}
+φI(1− φF )Emax {WI(w￿I), UI(wI)}+ (1− φF )(1− φI)UI(wI)]
(4)
Despite oﬀ we do not allow the arrival of oﬀers when the worker is employed. Unemployed
workers may get simultaneous oﬀers from the formal an the informal sector. This allows workers
to transition from formal to informal employment and vice versa although the have to go through
at least one period of unemployment.
The value functions in equilibrium define reservation wages. These will be used to define transitions
between employment and unemployment in both formal and informal sectors. Note that we will
have four diﬀerent reservation wages: the reservation wage of an unemployed worker previously in
5The values of unemployment depend on wages only through transfers. If transfers are independent from wages
then the values of unemployment are scalars.
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the formal sector employment that evaluates an oﬀer from the formal sector: wRFF ; the reservation
wage of an unemployed worker previously in the informal sector that evaluates an oﬀer in the
formal sector: wRIF ; the reservation wage of an unemployed worker previously in the formal sector
that evaluates an oﬀer from the informal sector: wRFI ; and the reservation wage of an unemployed
worker previously in the informal sector that evaluates an oﬀer in the informal sector: wRII .
To define these reservation wages we use the system of value functions (1)-(4). We assume that
the following suﬃcient conditions for the existence of reservation wages hold. For any two pair of
wages (w(1)F , w
(1)
I ) ≥ (w(2)F , w(2)I ): (1) WF (w(1)F ) ≥ WF (w(2)F ) for i ∈ {F, I}, (2) Ui(w(1)i ) ≥ Ui(w(2)i )
for i ∈ {F, I} and Wi(w(1)i ) −Wi(w(2)i ) ≥ Ui(w(1)i ) − Ui(w(2)i ) for i ∈ {F, I}. This will guarantee
that there are unique reservation wages and that wages above these values will induce the worker
to choose employment over unemployment.
WF
￿
wRFF
￿
= UF
￿
wRFF
￿
(5)
WI
￿
wRII
￿
= UI
￿
wRII
￿
(6)
WF
￿
wRIF
￿
= UI
￿
wRIF
￿
(7)
WI
￿
wRFI
￿
= UF
￿
wRFI
￿
(8)
3.1.2 Steady State Employment, Unemployment and Wage Distributions
With the reservation wages we are able to define the steady state levels of employment and
unemployment and then stationary wage distributions in the formal and informal sectors. Let
eFt be the employment in the formal sector at date t. Similarly we can define e
I
t , u
F
t and u
I
t .
The evolution of these variables is driven by reservation wages, the exogenous distribution of wage
oﬀers, the exogenous probabilities of separation and the exogenous probabilities of drawing a wage
oﬀer.
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The evolution of these aggregate variables is defined by the following set of diﬀerence equations:
eF,t+1 = (1− λF )eF,t + φF (1− φI)
￿￿
1−GF (wRFF )
￿
uF,t +
￿
1−GF (wRIF )
￿
uI,t
￿
+ φFφI
￿￿
1−GF (wRFF )
￿ ￿
1−GI(wRFI)
￿
prob (wF > wI) uF,t +
￿
1−GF (wRFF )
￿
GI(w
R
FI)uF,t
+
￿
1−GF (wRIF )
￿ ￿
1−GI(wRII)
￿
prob (wF > wI) uI,t +
￿
1−GF (wRIF )
￿
GI(w
R
II)uI,t
￿
eI,t+1 = (1− λI)eI,t + φI(1− φF )
￿￿
1−GI(wRFI)
￿
uF,t +
￿
1−GI(wRII)
￿
uI,t
￿
+ φFφI
￿￿
1−GF (wRFF )
￿ ￿
1−GI(wRFI)
￿
prob (wI > wF ) uF,t +
￿
1−GF (wRFF )
￿
GI(w
R
FI)uF,t
+
￿
1−GF (wRIF )
￿ ￿
1−GI(wRII)
￿
prob (wI > wF ) uI,t +
￿
1−GF (wRIF )
￿
GI(w
R
II)uI,t
￿
uF,t+1 =
￿
(1− φF )(1− φI) + φF (1− φI)GF (wRFF ) + φI(1− φF )GI(wRFI)
+ φFφIGF (w
R
FF )GI(w
R
FI)
￿
uF,t + λF eF,t
1 = eF,t+1 + eI,t+1 + uF,t+1 + uI,t+1
Consider the first equation that define employment in the formal sector next period. The
first component is the mass of workers whom did not loose their formal employment. The second
component are those workers that accept and oﬀer from the formal sector. Finally we have the
unemployed workers in the formal and informal sector that get acceptable oﬀers from both sectors
but the formal sector oﬀer dominates the informal sector oﬀer. The second equation follows a
similar logic. The third and forth equations describe the evolution of unemployment in the formal
and informal sector. Consider the third equation. The formal unemployment rate tomorrow is the
sum of those formal workers that do not get an oﬀer, plus those that get oﬀers but reject them.
Finally there is an inflow of workers that loose their employment in the formal sector. These
system of equations define a steady state for the employment and unemployment distribution.
Next we need to define the equilibrium distribution of accepted wage oﬀers. These can be computed
from the primitive distribution of wage oﬀers and rational individual behavior. Define ΓF,t and
ΓI,t as the equilibrium distribution of accepted wage oﬀers on each sector:
ΓF,t+1(wF ) = (1− λF )ΓF,t(wF ) + φF (1− φI)gF (wF )
￿
I
￿
wF ≥ wRFF
￿
uF,t + I
￿
wF ≥ wRIF
￿
uI,t
￿
+ φFφIgF (wF )
￿
I
￿
wF ≥ wRFF
￿ ￿
1−GI(wRFI)
￿
prob (wF > wI) uF,t
+ I
￿
wF ≥ wRFF
￿
GI(w
R
FI)uF,t + I
￿
wF ≥ wRIF
￿ ￿
1−GI(wRII)
￿
prob (wF > wI) uI,t
+ I
￿
wF ≥ wRIF
￿
GI(w
R
II)uI,t
￿
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ΓI,t+1(wI) = (1− λI)ΓI,t(wI) + φI(1− φF )gI(wI)
￿
I
￿
wI ≥ wRFI
￿
uF,t + I
￿
wI ≥ wRII
￿
uI,t
￿
+ φFφIgI(wI)
￿
I
￿
wI ≥ wRFI
￿ ￿
1−GF (wRFF )
￿
prob (wI > wF ) uF,t
+ I
￿
wI ≥ wRFI
￿
GF (w
R
FF )uF,t + I
￿
wI ≥ wRII
￿ ￿
1−GF (wRIF )
￿
prob (wI > wF ) uI,t
+ I
￿
wI ≥ wRII
￿
GF (w
R
IF )uI,t
￿
Each of the equations define a steady state measure of accepted wage oﬀers: ΓF and ΓI . The
measures are normalized to one.
The steady state equilibrium transfer system can be defined as:
θuF + (1− θ)uI =
￿ ∞
0
T (wF )dΓF (wF )
which tells us that total resources collected by the government equal total transfers to the unem-
ployed from the formal and informal sector.
3.2 Extension to General Equilibrium
3.2.1 Equilibrium with Matching Frictions
Decision problem of firms:
We start by modeling the behavior of firms in the simplest way possible to be able to compare our
results with the decision model.
There is a continuum of firms with mass 1. Every firm may decide to post a vacancy in the formal
or in the informal sector. Firms can change their decision every period. Firms discount future
values at the rate β (the same rate as workers do.) Vacancies fill at a random rate that is sector
dependent qi(θ), where i ∈ {F, I}. This rate comes from matching technology as it is standard in
the literature of search with matching frictions. The parameter θ is the labor market tightness.
We assume it is not sector specific because there is a unique labor market but two diﬀerent sectors.
When a vacancy is filled a quality of the match is drawn from a distribution that depends on the
sector (Gi(xi.) The following two Bellman equations describe the problem of posting a vacancy:
1. Value of creating a vacancy in the formal sector:
VF = −cF + β (qF (θ)Emax {JF (x￿F ), VF , VI}+ (1− qF (θ))max {VF , VI})
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2. Value of creating a vacancy in the informal sector:
VI = −cI + β (qI(θ)Emax {JI(x￿I), VF , VI}+ (1− qI(θ))max {VF , VI})
where Ji(xi) is the value of a filled vacancy We assume that the cost of creating a vacancy is not
the same in the formal sector and informal sector. We believe the assumption is reasonable as
formal and informal vacancies may use diﬀerent advertisement mechanism to reach workers. In
equilibrium, the value of vacancies is zero. Otherwise, firms would be creating vacancies in either
sector until any possible gain in value disappears. This gives us two job creation conditions
cF = βqF (θ)Emax {JF (x￿F ), 0}
and
cI = βqI(θ)Emax {JI(x￿I), 0}
When a vacancy is filled, worker and firm sign a contract (either legal or implicit) that pays the
worker a wage wi(xi) for producing xi units of consumption. If the vacancy filled is formal, the
firm is labeled as formal and has to pay social contributions for the worker (τsc) The formal firm
has to pay a severance payment when the match is destroyed (S(xF ).) We assume matches are
destroyed at an exogenous rate λi As formal employed workers usually have to fill an income tax
form, we assume that income taxes are paid only by the employed workers6. A filled vacancy has
a value Ji(xi) that depends on the productivity realization. The value of a formal employment
can be written as:
JF (xF ) =
xF − (1 + τsc)wF (xF )− βλFS(wF (xF ))
1− β(1− λF )
similarly the value of an informal firm can be written as:
JI(xI) =
xI − wI(xI)
1− β(1− λI)
Decision problem of workers:
Workers face the same set of decisions than in the toy version of this model. However, there are
two main diﬀerences: wages are not exogenous anymore but depend on the bargaining process
with the formal and informal firms, and job finding probabilities are endogenous. Also the tax and
transfers system has two diﬀerent components first a tax that is used to fund social contributions.
This tax is levied on firms, but firms levy it on workers through the wage equation, and it is
a constant fraction of wages. The second component is a tax schedule that is levied on formal
6We abstract from business taxes
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workers to fund general government spending. We assume that informal workers do not pay any
tax.
The decision of workers can be summarized by a set of four Bellman equations:
1. Value of being employed in the formal sector: note that we do not allow for on the job search
so far:
WF (xF ) = wF (xF )− T ((1− τsc)wF (xF )) + β [λFUF (xF ) + (1− λF )WF (xF )] (9)
2. Value of being employed in the informal sector
WI(xI) = wI(xI) + β [λIUI(xI) + (1− λI)WI(xI)] (10)
3. Value of being unemployed in the formal sector
UF (xF ) = ΩscF (wF (xF )) + S(wF (xF )) + Ω
g
F (wF (xF ))
+β [qF (θ)qI(θ)Emax {WF (x￿F ),WI(x￿I), UF (xF )}
+qF (θ)(1− qI(θ))Emax {WF (x￿F ), UF (xF )}
+ qI(θ)(1− qF (θ))Emax {WI(x￿I), UF (xF )}+ (1− qF (θ))(1− qI(θ))UF (xF )]
(11)
4. Value of being unemployed in the informal sector
UI(xI) = ΩscI (wI(xI)) + Ω
g
I(wI(xI)) + β [qF (θ)qI(θ)Emax {WF (x￿F ),WI(x￿I), UI(xI)}
+qF (θ)(1− qI(θ))Emax {WF (x￿F ), UI(xI)}
+qI(θ)(1− qI(θ))Emax {WI(x￿I), UI(xI)}+ (1− qF (θ))(1− qI(θ))UI(xI)]
(12)
where Ωsci (wi(xi)) are the transfers component that is financed through social contributions and
Ωgi (wi(xi)) are the transfers component financed through general taxation.
Definition of equilibrium:
To define an equilibrium in this model we need to characterize three elements: the bargaining
process between workers and firms, the evolution of employment and unemployment and the
equilibrium distribution of productivities in the formal and informal sector.
Lets begin with the bargaining process. We assume that workers and firms negotiate wages in a
Nash bargaining process, as it is standard in the literature. There are two negotiation processes,
one for the formal sector workers and firms and another one for the informal sector. The wage
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schedules can be found implicitly as a solution to the following system of equations
WF (xF )− UF (xF ) = αF (WF (xF ) + JF (xF )− VF − UF (xF ))
WI(xI)− UI(xI) = αI (WI(xI) + JI(xI)− VI − UI(xI))
where αF and αI are the bargaining powers of workers in the formal and informal sectors.
The evolution of employment, unemployment and productivities is similar to the system spelled
out in the previous section but we have to change φi for qi(θ) and wages are now a function of the
latent productivities. We do not repeat all the algebra to save space.
We assume that the budget of the government balances. Now it has two components: the first
one are the social contribution taxes that it are devoted to provide social services.
τsc
￿
wF (xF )dΓ(xF ) =
￿
(ΩscF (wF (xF )) + S(wF (xF ))) dΓ(xF ) +
￿
ΩscI (wI(xI))dΓ(xI)
where Γ(xi) are the steady state equilibrium distributions of latent productivities in the formal
and in formal sectors. The budget balance for general government spending is given by￿
T ((1− τsc)wF (xF ))dΓ(xF ) =
￿
ΩgF (wF (xF ))dΓ(xF ) +
￿
ΩgI(wI(xI))dΓ(xI)
A steady state equilibrium in this economy is a list: Wi(xi), Ui(xi), Ji(xi), Vi, wi(xi), Γi(xi),
qi(θ), θ, τsc, T ((1− τsc)wF (xF )), Ωsci (xi) and Ωgi (xi) such that:
1. Taking wi(xi), qi(θ), τsc, T ((1 − τsc)wF (xF )), Ωsci (xi) and Ωgi (xi) as given, Wi(xi), Ui(xi)
solve the system of Bellman equations for workers’ decisions
2. Taking wi(xi), qi(θ), (wF (xF )) and τsc as given Ji(xi) and Vi solve the system of Bellman
equations for firms’ decisions
3. Nash bargaining: wi(xi) are solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the formal and
informal sectors
4. Γi(xi) are consistent with optimal behavior of workers and firms, wages set through Nash
bargaining, job finding rates and the latent distribution of productivities
5. Budgets of the Government balance
3.2.2 Competitive Search Equilibrium
[WORK IN PROGRESS]
13
4 Calibration
To calibrate the model we use simulated GMM. As a first step we set θ = 1 which means that
informal-unemployed do not get any transfer. We assume that the tax schedule levied on the
formal workers is proportional T (wF ) = τwF and we set τ = .15, which roughly represents the
average tax on income that is levied on formal workers. Formal-unemployed workers get a lump-
sum transfer that equals collected taxes.
ΩF = τ
￿ ∞
0
wFdΓF (wF )
We assume that wage oﬀers of formal and informal sectors are drawn from i.i.d. log-normal
distributions with potentially diﬀerent mean and variance
log(wi)→ N(µi, σ2i ) where i ∈ {F, I}
This gives us eight parameters to calibrate that we collect in the vector
ϕ = (λF ,λI ,φF ,φI , µF , µI , σF , σI)
We chose the vector of parameters that minimized the mean squared percent deviation from a set
of statistics from ENOE. The statistics we choose are the fraction of employees in the formal sector
(eˆF ), the fraction of employees in the informal sector (eˆI), total unemployment (uˆ), unemployment
in the informal sector (uˆI), mean wage in the formal sector relative to the informal sector (
w¯F
w¯I
),
mean wage in the informal sector (w¯I , we normalize this number to 1,) coeﬃcient of variation of
wages in the formal sector (cvF ) and coeﬃcient of variation of wages in the informal sector (cvI .)
The following table shows the vector of parameters that minimized the mean squared deviation of
the simulated moments to their ENOE equivalents It is worth commenting that the probability of
Table 3. Calibrated Parameters
λF λI φF φI µF µI σF σI
.030 .043 .425 1.000 .002 -.498 .881 .780
loosing a job in the formal sector is smaller than the probability of loosing a job in the informal
sector. This is probably due to severance payments and other employment regulations that aﬀect
formal employment only. It is also more than twice as likely to get an oﬀer in the informal
sector than in the formal sector. This parameters should be interpreted carefully until we have a
general equilibrium version of the model, where job finding and job destruction probabilities will
be endogenously determined. These estimated parameters induce the following moments that we
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compare to those in the data in the next table.
Table 4. Calibration Performance
eF eI u uI
w¯F
w¯I
w¯I cvF cvI
Data .419 .539 .041 .024 1.600 1.000 1.000 .868
Model .418 .538 .043 .026 1.528 1.033 1.016 .793
The model provides a very good match of employment and unemployment. It matches em-
ployment in the formal and informal sector up to two decimal points. The model also matches
the distribution of unemployment and total unemployment, even though total unemployment is
over estimated by .002 percentage points but formal unemployment is matches accurately. The
model is also very accurate capturing the first order and second order moments of the observed
distribution of wages. The distributions of accepted wages imply a Gini coeﬃcient of .45 for the
formal sector employees and .35 for the informal sector employees. Overall, the Gini coeﬃcient is
.42. The OECD reports a Gini coeﬃcient around .45 in the last decade. This is remarkable as the
model is very parsimonious7
As can be seen in Table 3, our model also implies that accounting for the selection into formal
and informal sectors reduces the formal wage premium by 13%. This means that this wage pre-
mium is bigger than what we observe in the data. However, the relative variability of the ex-ante
distribution of wages is smaller than the variability for the accepted wage oﬀer distributions.
Table 5. Distribution of Wage Oﬀers
Distribution µFµI
cvF
cvI
Ex-Ante 1.768 1.142
Ex-Post 1.528 1.280
Figure 1 plots the distribution of accepted wage oﬀers in the formal (panel (a)) and the infor-
mal sector (panel (b)) against the ex-ante distribution of wage oﬀers. We observe a substantial
diﬀerence between ex-ante and ex-post distributions. Selection into formal and informal employ-
ment tilts the distribution of accepted wage oﬀers to the right of the ex-ante distribution of wage
oﬀers. It can also be noted that the distribution of accepted wage oﬀers has two kinks. Consider
panel (a), the first kink is a mass point of zero and it is the reservation wage of informal unem-
ployed workers (wRIF .) that consider to accept a formal employment oﬀer. Changes in this value
will change the bottom tail of the distribution of accepted wage oﬀers. The second kink is the
reservation wage of formal unemployed workers (wRFF ) Changes in this value may have big eﬀects
7In particular, given that we are abstracting from an intensive margin in the choice of hours and a more detailed
modeling of transfers, to mention a few.
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on the mass of wages that concentrate around the average. The same comments apply to panel
(b). The first kink would be the reservation wage for an informal unemployed worker (wRII) and
the second kink for those formal unemployed workers (wRFI)
Figure 1. Ex-Ante vs. Accepted Wage Distributions
(a) Formal Sector (b) Informal Sector
16
5 Policy Simulation
In this section we analyze two types of policy reforms: changing the generosity of the transfers
system and changes in the distribution of the transfers between formal and informal workers.
5.1 Changes in Distribution of Transfers
We will keep taxes constant at the benchmark level of 15% but change the distribution of the
transfers between formal and informal workers. Starting from the benchmark assumption in which
formal workers get all the transfers when they become unemployed, we increase the share that
informal workers get from the transfers system.
Dividing transfers equally between formal and informal workers increases the share of the informal
sector by 5 percentage points, as we can see in Table 6. This number is similar to what we find
when we double the size of transfers. It is also interesting to note that even though total unem-
ployment does not change, its distribution between formal an informal sector changes. For our
benchmark calibration informal unemployed workers represent 60% of total unemployed. When
we divide transfers equally between formal and informal unemployed workers, this share raises by
9%. If we look at how does inequality change when we change the distribution of transfers we
see that in the formal sector inequality goes down while in the informal sector inequality goes up,
leaving total inequality roughly constant. Therefore, extending benefits to the informal sector in-
creases its size substantially without changing inequality. On the other hand, restricting transfers
to formal workers would increase the size of formal sector by almost 3 percentage points8
Table 6. Changes in Distribution
θ 1 .8 .6 .5 .4 .2
eF .438 .417 .391 .367 .367 .355
eI .517 .540 .567 .582 .590 .602
uF .020 .017 .014 .013 .012 .011
uI .024 .025 .027 .028 .029 .030
w¯F 1.572 1.577 1.621 1.652 1.673 1.715
w¯I 1.037 1.011 .985 .970 .962 .955
GiniF .441 .437 .425 .419 .415 .407
GiniI .357 .350 .349 .353 .356 .361
Gini .418 .416 .413 .414 .414 .415
Changing the distribution of transfers from 20% to informal workers to 50% also have a big
8This is a big number as if we consider an economically active population of 65 million, 3 percentage points are
roughly 3 million.
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impact on the distribution of accepted wage oﬀers in the formal sector. Average wage increases
by 6%, this number raises to 9% when informal workers get 80% of the transfers. The increase in
average wage goes through the increase in the reservation wage of informal unemployed workers,
the bottom tail of the distribution, as we can see in panel (a) of Figure 2. Similarly average
wages fall in the informal sector because the value of informal unemployment raises more than the
value of informal employment. Being unemployed from the informal sector becomes an attractive
alternative. Average wages fall for the informal employed workers by 4% (by 6% when 80% of
transfers are given to informal unemployed workers)
Figure 2. Changes in Distribution of Transfers and Distribution of Wages
(a) Formal Sector (b) Informal Sector
We support this interpretation in Table 7, checking how do the reservation wages change when
we increase the share of transfers that the informal workers get.
Table 7. Changes in Reservation Wages
τ 1 .8 .6 .5 .4 .2
wRFF .439 .420 .392 .3839 .367 .351
wRIF .066 .201 .328 .3839 .420 .480
wRFI .644 .514 .383 .3210 .274 .201
wRII .245 .280 .313 .3210 .328 .343
The reservation wages that aﬀect both distributions move in opposite directions. As the share
of transfers that formal workers perceive falls while keeping the same tax rate, wRFF falls. However,
the reservation wage of informal unemployed workers to accept an oﬀer in the formal sector raises.
Quantitatively, the overall eﬀect induces a raise in the average wage of the formal sector.
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5.2 Changes in the Size of the Transfers
We will keep the distribution of transfers constant to its benchmark level and change the size of
transfers from a tax rate of 5% to a tax rate of 55%. Note that as the budget balances this is
equivalent to a change in transfers’ size.
Increasing the size of transfers first reduces the size of informal employment because the value
of the transfers that a worker gets when unemployed in the formal sector out-weights the cost in
terms of higher taxes. As the size of transfers rise this drop reverses and informal employment
raises again, as can be observed in Table 8. The eﬀects of doubling the size of transfers are
quantitatively important: informal employment drops by 5 percentage points.
Table 8. Changes in Size
τ 5% 15% 25% 35% 45% 55%
eF .386 .417 .446 .464 .467 .450
eI .573 .540 .507 .484 .475 .486
uF .013 .017 .022 .027 .033 .039
uI .026 .025 .024 .023 .023 .024
w¯F 1.544 1.577 1.648 1.747 1.882 2.018
w¯I .935 1.010 1.099 1.183 1.260 1.309
GiniF .443 .437 .428 .420 .413 .417
GiniI .366 .350 .343 .340 .342 .345
Gini .430 .416 .405 .398 .396 .403
Note also that total unemployment raises and tilts towards the formal sector because the
incentives to remain unemployed increase with the raise in the size of the transfers’ program.
Doubling the size of transfers increases unemployment by .8%. The eﬀect on the distribution of
accepted wage oﬀers is big. Doubling the size of transfers increases average wages in the formal
sector by 10% and it increases average wages by 16% in the informal sector. The eﬀects on wage
inequality are small.
Table 9 spells out how the distribution of employment, unemployment and accepted wage oﬀers
changes. In the formal sector, the reservation wage of formal workers raises because the value
of being unemployed increases. The value of formal employment increases too, but the increase
in the value of unemployment dominates. The increase in the value of formal employment over
the value of informal unemployment makes the reservation wage of informal workers to accept a
formal employment oﬀer drop. This is what creates the U-shape on the size of the informal sector.
Figure 3 illustrates how changes in the reservation wages map into changes in the distributions
of accepted wage oﬀers.
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Table 9. Changes in Reservation Wages
τ 5% 15% 25% 35% 45% 55%
wRFF .300 .420 .575 .754 .990 1.301
wRIF .234 .201 .154 .096 .029 .000
wRFI .335 .514 .705 .864 1.013 1.109
wRII .256 .280 .300 .321 .335 .343
Figure 3. Changes in Size of Transfers and Distribution of Wages
(a) Formal Sector (b) Informal Sector
5.3 Interaction between Size and Distribution
In this section we show how the combination of size of transfers and its distribution between formal
and informal workers shape employment, unemployment, wages, inequality and the weight of the
informal sector in measured GDP in our model.
Figure 4 shows the composition of the size of the formal and informal sector in the steady state.
The figure clearly shows that the eﬀects of policy on the size of the informal sector depends on the
combination of size and distribution of transfers. If the formal sector receives all transfers we get
the biggest reduction on the size of the informal sector. The minimum size of the informal sector is
achieved when formal workers get all transfers and the size of the transfers system is considerably
increased from 15% of wages in the formal sector to 45%. However, the size of the informal sector
can only be reduced when a bigger share is given to it when the size of the transfers is reduced.
Figure 5 shows the composition of employment in both formal and informal sectors. It tracks the
composition of the sectors shown in Figure 4. The logic on how changes in size and distribution
aﬀect employment and unemployment was explained in previous sections.
Figure 6 shows the composition of unemployment. When size increases total unemployment
raises, but also unemployment on each of the sectors. When all transfers are given to the formal
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Figure 4. Changes in Policies and Sectoral Composition
(a) Formal Sector (b) Informal Sector
Figure 5. Changes in Policies and Employment Composition
(a) Formal Sector (b) Informal Sector
sector, increasing the size of the transfers system increases formal unemployment but reduces
informal unemployment because it is attractive to accept an oﬀer in the formal sector and then
randomly become a formal unemployed worker.
Figure 7 shows how the combination of policies change the composition of GDP, in hour model
GDP =
￿ ∞
0
wFdΓF (wF ) +
￿ ∞
0
wIdΓI(wI)
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Figure 6. Changes in Policies and Unemployment Composition
(a) Formal Sector (b) Informal Sector
so GDP is aﬀected by changes in the total measure of formal and informal employees9 and changes
in the shape of the distribution.
In the Appendix we show similar figures for average wages and inequality.
Figure 7. Changes in Policies and Composition of GDP
9As
￿∞
0 dΓi(wi) = ei where i ∈ {F, I}
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6 Conclusion
We have built a search model that features four diﬀerent labor market states to capture the choice
of workers to be employed in the formal or informal sectors. We do this to study key features
of Mexican labor markets to evaluate some important policy reforms. Even though the policies
analyzed are very stylized they capture three main features of taxes and transfers: the split of the
budget between formal and informal workers, the size of the system and its progressivity. As a
consequence of their choice and current tax and transfers system, unemployment also depend on
the sector.
We calibrate the model to Mexican data because of its relative quality, but our model may ap-
ply to other countries. A very simple specification of the model is able to match accurately key
statistics of the Mexican economy. With the calibrated version of the model we perform several
simulation exercises to quantify the eﬀects of tax and transfers policies aimed to increase the value
of formality. This policies are now in the center of a vivid policy debate.
We find that giving a bigger share of transfers to informal workers increase the size of the informal
sector by a substantial amount and it does not make the distribution of wage oﬀers more equal.
There are also a potentially important reallocation of the labor force across sectors and produc-
tivities. Based on our findings, programs like universal health care or universal unemployment
insurance may not be a good idea after all.
On the other hand, increasing the size of the transfers program reduces the size of the informal.
Therefore increasing social protection to formal workers only may be the way to go to fight infor-
mality with taxes and transfers.
The next step of our research is to embed our model into a general equilibrium setup to evaluate
the consequences of the proposed policy reforms. Natural extensions would be to include an in-
tensive margin for labor choice, asset accumulation with credit constraints. These features seem
relevant for economies such as Mexico and will be included in the future versions of this paper.
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8 Appendix
Figure 8. Changes in Policies and Inequality
(a) Formal Sector (b) Informal Sector
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Figure 9. Changes in Policies and Wages
(a) Formal Sector (b) Informal Sector
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